Wealth and Power in a Collegial Polity by Gardner, Roy
Economic Staff Paper Series Economics
12-1981
Wealth and Power in a Collegial Polity
Roy Gardner
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_staffpapers
Part of the American Politics Commons, Business Administration, Management, and Operations
Commons, Income Distribution Commons, and the Political Economy Commons
This Report is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Economic Staff Paper Series by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gardner, Roy, "Wealth and Power in a Collegial Polity" (1981). Economic Staff Paper Series. 92.
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_staffpapers/92
Wealth and Power in a Collegial Polity
Abstract
This paper considers the reflection of political power upon the distribution of wealth in a collegial polity,
where political power is unequally distributed. Power and the economic outcome are both analyzed in terms
of the Shapley value. The more powerful a political agent is, the greater is that agent's final wealth, as given by
the value allocation.
Disciplines
American Politics | Business Administration, Management, and Operations | Income Distribution | Political
Economy
This report is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_staffpapers/92
Wealth and Power in a Collegial Polity
No. 92
by Roy Gardner
Department of Economics
Iowa State University
Ames, Iowa 50011
Abstract
This paper considers the reflection of political power upon the
distribution of wealth in a collegial polity, where political power is
unequally distributed. Power and the economic outcome are both analyzed in
terms of the Shapley value. The more powerful a political agent is, the
greater is that agent's final wealth, as given by the value allocation.
I. Introduction
One of the intriguing problems in the study of a society is the rela
tionship between wealth and power. It is often argued, for instance, that
political power is in the hand of the wealthy, because only they can afford
to acquire it. While this may be true, the present paper attempts to for
malize the relationship in the other direction, namely that wealth follows
political power. In order to carry out this formalization, the Shapley
value [3] will be employed.
Consider the following paradigm case of a social game. There are two
agents and one good. Each agent i has the same linear utility function, say
Ui(Xi) = x^. Each agent has an endowment of one unit of the good; hence,
wealth is distributed equally. However, one agent has all the political
power; call this agent 1, the dictator. In particular, agent 1 has the power
to levy taxes on agent'2 at rates up to 100%. If one applies Nash's bargain
ing theory [8] to this situation, one finds that the optimal threat point
is given by (u^, u^) = (1,0). At this point, the dictator threatens to tax
agent 2 at a rate of 100%, while agent 2 threatens to destroy his endowment
rather than pay the tax. In Nash's theory these threats are not carried out;
rather, a compromise is reached at the point (u^, u^) = (1.5, .5). At the
compromise outcome, the powerless agent 2 is paying a 50% tax. However, this
compromise tax rate does increase as the powerless agent becomes more risk
averse.
This paper generalizes the above results to the case in which endowments
are unequal, utility is not necessarily transferrable, the distribution of
political power is allowed to vary between equality and dictatorship, and
most important of all, the agents with the lesser political power can be
subdivided at will (form a nonatomic measure space). In this framework, the
results on power and taxation discovered by Aumann and Kurz [2] are reflected
as well in a collegial polity with a mixed (atom, ocean) space of agents.
II. Model
The political structure of the model is presented first. Let the set of
agents T = jc] U [0,1]. The point c, called the collegium, is an atom with
measure one. The interval [0,1], called the ocean, is endowed with Lebesque
measure p,. A coalition S c C is winning if it has the power to enact legis
lation. The complement of a winning coalition is losing. A coalition which
is neither winning nor losing in intermediate.
A coalition S is winning if and only if C e S and |x(S fl [0,1]) s of,
where is a parameter between zero and one. Since the collegium is a member
of every winning coalition, the political structure is that of collegial
polity, as defined by Brown [4]. Standard examples of collegial polities with
a finite member of agents are the Roman republic and the United Nations
Security Council (pre-1965). One can interpret the present model as an ap
proximation to a finite model with a very large number of players outside
the collegium.
Varying the parameter a reveals a large variety of collegial polities.
When a equals zero, for example, one has dictatorship. The collegium essen
tially is winning by itself, since it requires measure zero support from the
ocean. For a equals .5, the collegium requires half the ocean's support, as
was the case in the Roman republic. For cy equals one, essentially the only
winning coalition is T itself. In this case, legislation can only be passed
by unanimous consent.
Political power in a collegial polity is measured by the Shapley value,
as proposed in [10]. The Shapley value measures the probability that a
player is pivotal to a coalition, in the sense that the coalition is winning
if it includes the player, and not winning if it excludes him. Let cp (•)
denote this probability. Xn [10]» it is shown that the distribution of poli
tical power is directly related to a by the formula
(1) cp (lc|) = l-of
cp (t) dt = a dt 0 ^ t ^ 1
The collegium is more powerful, the smaller the percentage of the ocean re
quired to win, and all powerful, when it wins by itself.
The economic structure of the model is as follows. There is an initial
distribution p of a single good, satisfying
P(c) =
(2) p(t) dt = p2dt 0 ^ t ^ 1 p^ s 0, P2 > 0
The after-tax distribution x may differ from p, but in any event must satisfy
A
(3) p(c) +
0^2
dt = x(c) + x(t) dt.
0
Each agent in the ocean has the same utility function u^^(t)^ =u(^(t)^
while the collegium has the utility function u^(^x(c)^ . All utility functions
are assumed to be concave, continuously differentiable, increasing, and to
vanish at the origin.
To analyze the combined political economic situation, it is necessary
to construct the characteristic function showing what a given coalition S is
worth.
Since utility is hot necessarily transferable, one introduces the \-
transfer function x(t) to facilitate the comparison of utilities. Given
\(t), V.(T) is defined to be the value of
\
(4) max \(c)u^(x(c)^ +I X(t)u(x(t)^
subject to (3).
To define (S) for S cr T, introduce the notation
r (S) =max X(c)a^(x(c)^+ \(t) x (t) dt
sn[o,i]
S.T. p(c) + p(t) dt = x(c) + x(t) dt
sn[0,i] sn[o,i]
if c is present, and analagously if c is absent. Recalling the argument eind
notation [2, especially p.1144], suppose S forms and bargains against the
counter coalition T-S. S and T-S are assumed to reach a Nash bargain based
on the threat point W (S), given by
(5) r, (S) if S is winning
A
W. (S) = (S) - r (T-S) if S is intermediate
-r (T-S) if S is losing
K
The reasoning behind (5) is as follows: In every case, the threat point
Wj^(S) represents the
min max f(a,T) - g (ff,T)
T a
where a belongs to set of threat stategies available to S, and t belongs to
the set of strategies available to T-S. Here, f((y,T) represents the utility
to S if the threats (o">t) are actually carried out; and likewise g (a,t)
represents the utility to T-S. Since the ultimate Nash bargain will allocate
to S
[1/2 v^(T) + f-g],
it is clear that S seeks to maximize, T-S to minimize f-g.
Now, suppose S is winning and T-S is losing. The optimal threat
strategy for S is to tax T-S at 100% and allocate the proceeds effciently
among its members. The optimal counter strategy''' for T-S is to destroy its
resources. Hence, f(cT,T) = ^ (S), g(CT,T) = 0 and W (S) = r (S) . By symmetry,
if S losing, then W (T-S) == r. (T-S) and so W (S) = -r (T-S).
K K X A
Finally, if both S and T-S are intermediate, neither has any tax power,
and their optimal threat strategies are to produce efficiently within them
selves. Since the underlying Nash bargain measures the worth of S, v (S)
A
satisfies
(6) Vj-.(S) =1/2 (v^(T) +W^(S))
The objective then is to define the Shapley value cp for the game v. (S) and to
A
see to what extent the allocation underlying the value differs from the
initial endowment. This is pursued in the next section.
III. Results
Given a finite, transferable utility game (T,v) in characteristic
function form, the Shapley value cpv is uniquely defined by the following
axioms [l,p.613]
(i) Additivity: cp(v-tw) = cpv + cpw
(ii) Symmetry: (cpv)(jip = (cpv)(jji) whenever i and j are substitutes
(iii) Efficiency: (cpv) (T) = v(T)
(iv) Null player: (cpvXji]) = 0 whenever i is a null player.
This value must be extended to games with an infinite number of agents and
nontransferable utility.
The former extension is made by considering all sequences of games
approaching the limit game with T = c| U [0,1]. If the Shapley values of
all such games, regardless of the sequence, approach the same limiting value,
that limit is defined to be the asymptotic value of the game with infinitely
many agents. Note that the asymptotic value satisfies conditions (ii) and
(iii) .
The latter extension is made by supposing that given X> utility is trans
ferable. Let cpv. represent the Shapley value given this supposition. A value
allocation x is defined such that
(7a) \(c)u^(x(c)^ =cpvj^(ic|)
(7b) X(t) u(^(t)y dt =cpv^ (t) dt 0^t <: 1.
A value allocation x is realized solely by transfers of resources. If the
X in (7) are such that the maxima in (4) and (5) are actually reached at x,
then cpv is defined to be the Shapley value for the non-transferable utility
X
gone.
Interest thus centers on the asymptotic Shapley vsiLue of the non-trans-
ferable utility game (T,v ). In this regard, the basic result is the following:
X
Proposition 1. The asymptotic value cov^ of the atom-ocean taxation game is
given by
pi pi
(8a) cpv. (jcj) « r (s,c) ds -
^ ^0 ^ "^l-a
r^(s) ds
(8b) cpv^(t) =(y^(T) - cp v^(c)^ 0^ t ^1
Proof. Using the results of [6,7], the asymptotic value of the atom c is
given by
1
(9) cpv^(ic|) = v^(s,c) -
where v ((S,c)) denotes v ([O.s] U (cp, and v (s) denotes v.([0,s]).
K A X A
Consider first the case when ^ < .5. On the interval [0,q'], the addition
of the collegium makes a losing coalition intermediate; on [a, l-al> the
addition of the collegium makes a losing coalition winning; an [1-c^, 1]) the
addition of the collegium makes an Intermediate coalition winning. Substituting
into (9), in making use of (5) and (6), one has
(10) cpv(jc]) =J r^s.c) - 1/2 (Vj^(T) - r^(l-s,c)^ds
i»l-a
a
.1
1-a
+ 1/2 (y^m + ds.
1/2 (yj^(T) +r^(s,c) - 1/2 (^v^(T) - v (l-s,c)^ds
Collecting terms, and noting that
fl-a
a
r^(s,c) =
fl-a
Of
r^(l-s,c), and
•Of pi
r (l-s,c) = ! r (s,c), one arrives at (8a).
0 ^ ""l-a ^
The argument for of > .5 is similar, pn the interval [0,l-(y], the addi
tion of the collegium makes a losing coalition intermediate; on the interval
[l-a> a]> the addition of the collegium makes an intermediate coalition inter
mediate; on the interval [a,l], the addition of the collegium makes an inter
mediate coalition winning. Evaluating the integral analogous to (10), one
again reaches (8a). Finally (8b) follows from the symmetry and efficiency
conditions on the aymptotic Shapley value.
Two immediate implications of proposition 1 are contained in the following:
Proposition 2. (a) The value allocation of the collegium is greater than its
endowment, (b) The value allocation of the collegium is an increasing function
of its political power 1-a.
Proof. Part (a) follows from the theorem of the mean for the integral applied
to (8a). Part (b) follows since the right-hand side integral of (8a) de
creases as l-(y increases.
The meaning of the value allocation will be clarified by considering
some examples.
Example 1. u^ = x(t), u^ = x(c). This is the transferable utility case,
\(t) = X(c) = 1. Since r^(s,c) = p^+sp^, ~ sp^, (8a) implies in this
(1-case that x(c) = p(c) + ^ p^ The collegium retains its endowment and
collects a tax from the ocean in proportion to its political power, reaching
a maximum of 50% when it is dictatorial.
Example 2. Same as example 1, except u^ = /x(c). Without loss of gen
erality, let \(t) = 1. The allocation of example 1 is still the value alloca
tion, as substituting X(c) - 2 /x(c) , x(c) as above in the equation (7a) = (8a)
shows. Indeed, for any allowable u , the value allocation remains the same
o
as in example 1,
Example 3. Same as example 1, except that u^ =x(t)^; 0 < a < 1. Here,
it is not possible to solve for X(c), x(c) in closed form; however, some idea
of the outcome can be gained from table 1, computed by numerical integration
for the case = p2 = 1.
10
Table 1. Value allocation to the
a 0 .5 1
1 1.000 1.125 1.500
.5 1.000 1.224 i.667
As expected, the collegium's value allocation increases as its political
power increases. The value allocation of the collegium approaches its maxi
mum of + p2 = 2 when it is dictatorial and a approaches 0, i.e., as the
ocean approaches the extreme of risk aversion. Further, the collegium value
allocation increases as the risk aversion of the members of the ocean increases
Indeed, when the collegium is dictatorial, it is collecting the taxes paid by
the ocean at the Aumann-Kurz marginal tax rate .
Again, as in example 2, one finds that the risk aversion of the collegium
does not affect its value allocation. This is perhaps the greatest difference
from the case where the ocean bargains as a single agent; for there, the value
allocation depends on the risk postures of both sides.
11
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